“Followership” in response to Post-Cold War WMD Proliferation from 1989 - 2005: Britain and Australia

David A. Leitner

Advisor: Professor Gerald Steinberg

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Abstract

This work seeks to determine whether the West responded cohesively to weapons of mass destruction proliferation (WMD) from 1989 – 2005. It does so by applying organizational psychology’s followership framework to examine whether Britain and Australia had similar antiproliferation policies to that of the alignment leader – the US. The level of followership represents alignment cohesion.

While the examination of each state’s policies can stand as an independent case study in antiproliferation and US – Follower relations, we further our understanding of cohesion through the followership comparative framework. Conclusions regarding antiproliferation efforts rely on qualitative analysis based on events data and content analysis.

The central question of this research is: how and why did western alignment cohesion change in response to proliferation in the post-Cold War? This analysis will show that the unity of purpose between the two “follower” states – Australia and Britain – was high at the outset of the post-Cold war period, reached a low in the mid-1990s, and returned to a high level by the end of 2004. The evidence and analytic framework indicate that the drop in alignment cohesion in the mid-1990s was first because the weaker states had a different perspective of proliferation as a revisionist threat, and second because the follower states did not accept the leader’s vision for countering proliferation as an attempt to revise the status-quo. The “follower identities” of the weaker states changed significantly throughout the 1989 -2005 period. The change from high level followers to low level was precipitated by the follower’s perception that proliferation was a diminishing threat to the status quo and that the leader’s vision to maintain the status quo was no longer relevant. As the follower’s perception of proliferation, as systemic revisionism, rose, with attempts at proliferation by states like Iran and North Korea, as well as non-state actors like Al Qaida, the follower states acceptance of the leader’s vision for maintaining the status quo. As each state returned to be a high-level follower, the level of “followership” rose within the alignment subsystem signifying cohesion in response to WMD proliferation.
This demonstrates the value of the followership framework in examining the issue of cohesion in response to proliferation in the post-Cold War. This approach also resolves the tension between realist and constructivist analytical frameworks in the examination of alignments.
Introduction

This work seeks to examine the “prevalent assumption that Western states have responded collectively to proliferation with an essentially cohesive strategy.”¹ It does so by comparing the policies of two states – Britain and Australia – in response to American leadership on the proliferation of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) from 1989 through 2005.²

The end of the Cold War presented an interesting dilemma regarding collective responses. With the structural change, concepts like patron-client relations, that explained the relationships between, and within, alignments, seemed to lose their relevancy.³

The collapse of the Soviet Union created the perception that the system had changed from a bipolar to a unipolar one, in which the United States was the hegemon. I argue, however, that the post-Cold War was a system in transition in which proliferation, terrorism, and rogues states were among the major issues that threatened the status-quo and led to a failed unipolar movement.⁴ These dimensions, as well as the rise of other economic and political powers, meant that the system has, instead, changed to a mixed multipolar one.

In order to examine alignment cohesion, I adapt organizational psychology’s followership framework and apply it to policies of the follower states with respect to the leader. In this analysis, the level of followership represents alignment cohesion. I will show that the level of followership is a product of the level of systemic revisionism and the similarity of identity, in terms of actions and goals, of each state within the alignment subsystem.

Research Problem

The examination of alignment cohesion is often a top down process that is dependent upon leadership and has little regard for what type of followers take part in the relationship.⁵ Leadership is a relationship in which one actor exercises influence and another actor submits to that influence.⁶ The leader uses influence to set goals and to achieve them.⁷ Among these goals is to foster cooperation through a commonality of purpose.⁸ History has shown that while a state may be the most powerful member of an
alignment, its leadership is called into question if it fails to create a commonality of purpose.

According to Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, there are two types of leaders in the followership framework, dominant or benevolent. The dominant leader does not have followers but rather subordinates or minions who collaborate with the leader due to coercion. The benevolent leader entices followers to accept the need for action towards a goal. “If leadership consists of getting things accomplished through others, then those ‘others’ are critical to the leader’s effectiveness.”

As such, the follower is a key factor in the examination of cohesion. Leadership is an actor exerting influence while followership is a commonality of purpose. True “followers want to feel as if they are partners with their leaders in accomplishing goals and defining a path to the future,” even if the contributions made by the leaders and followers are unequal.

The concept of followership is viewed in terms of the social construct paradigm, which compares states’ identities, in the form of goals and actions, with each other and with the alignment norms, as defined by the leader’s vision for systemic superiority. Even members that do not accept all the norms have a role in the alignment, and their policies can be analyzed through the followership framework.

This research project studies followership by examining state responses to elements of WMD proliferation. These elements are necessary for the creation and detonation an intact WMD and make up what Charles Ferguson and William Potter call the WMD proliferation “chain of causation.” The breakup of the Soviet Union; the attempts to procure WMD by Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Aum Shinrikyo, and Al-Qaeda; and the Abdul Qadeer Khan (A.Q. Khan) network, all demonstrated the accuracy of the assessment that proliferation represented one of the greatest systemic threats to the international status-quo. Jeremy Pressman noted that terrorism and proliferation were two means by which states attempted to counter the rise of American hegemony in the post-Cold War.
States, and non-state actors, tried to change the status quo because they learned that these weapons were “useful, and even desirable, even though the Cold War...ended.” Therefore, according to the theories that dominated international relations in the Cold War, weaker states should have aligned as a homogeneous, cohesive, group with a leader to counter this threat. This dissertation attempts to determine whether this occurred and to explain the behavior of the weaker states.

**Variables**

There are three variables in this research. The dependent variable is the level of followership, which is a function of the similarities between follower state identities. The independent variable is the level of systemic revisionism, which determines alignment formation at the systemic level. The intervening variable is the level of follower identity (which represents the similarity between the each follower state, based on their goals and actions, and the goals and actions of the alignment.

This paper argues that the level of revisionism leads to greater similarity between the alignment follower’s identities and the alignment norms because of the desire to either maintain the status quo or change it. The greater the level of systemic revisionism, the greater the similarities between identities, and thus, the greater the level of followership. This model of examination can be used to examine members of either status quo or revisionist alignments.

**Research Goals**

This work’s main approach is the application of organizational psychology’s followership framework to examine alignment cohesion in the post-Cold War period. This framework adds to our understanding of cooperation and expands alignment theory by incorporating a social construct for examining weaker state identities in followership. This approach resolves the tension between realist and constructivist theories by applying the constructivist perspectives of state identity to examine the level of followership within a neo-classical realist framework.

*See Appendix 1: Followership Types and Hierarchy of Followership*
It also furthers the examination of state responses to proliferation. As such, it adds to Richard Stubbs’, Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal’s, Charles Ferguson and William Potter’s, and David Cooper’s works and applies them into new, more specific, realms.

Assumptions
Three basic assumptions stand behind this work. 1. There is a post-Cold War status-quo alignment in response to WMD proliferation. 2. The US leads this alignment, as it did the Cold War Western alignment. 3. Britain and Australia are members of this alignment.

Research Questions
The main question this research seeks to answer is: How and why did western alignment followership change in response to WMD proliferation from 1989 - 2005? In order to answer this, I need to examine the weaker members and discover what factors influenced change in the policies and followership status of these states.

Hypotheses
Western alignment cohesion changed significantly from 1989 to 2005 as states became less likely to follower the US in response to WMD proliferation. While both Australia and Britain were highest-level, or “exemplary,” followers immediately after the Cold War, this level of similarity dropped, only to return after 9/11. The level of alignment followership rose after 9/11 because both Britain and Australia became highest-level followers in response to the process of proliferation.

There were many attempts at systemic revisionism in the post-Cold War. Non-state actor’s attempts at revisionism included Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attacks in Japan, Al Qaida’s attack on September 11, 2001 and its threat of WMD use, and Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan’s supplying nuclear technology and expertise. State actor’s attempts have included the transfer of North Korean Scud missiles to Yemen, North Korea’s detonation of a nuclear bomb, Iraq’s attempts to attain WMDs the confession of, and the rise of Iran as a possible nuclear state.

This change in perception led to a higher level of identity similarity among the alignment members and thus a higher level of followership. For example, prior to
September 11, 2001 Britain was a high-level follower vis-à-vis elements of proliferation. During this time, Australia acted as an “alienated,” or low-level, follower, choosing to take action and determine goals irrespective of the leader’s policies. After September 11, 2001, and the threat of WMD use by Al Qaida, the similarity between Australia’s identity and the leader’s vision for status-quo rose significantly, thus changing Australia’s status to “exemplary” follower and raising the level of alignment followership.

**Understanding Followership**

This research revolves around the juncture between two aspects of international relations. The first is leadership and the second is state responses to WMD proliferation.

The examination of leadership in the international system has been seen, most often, as a top-down process dependent on either power or an institutional structure. As such, this ignores the role of followers in examining effective leadership and interstate interaction.

Instead of accepting a top-down perspective, this research examines leadership without examining the leader. As such, it concentrates on the follower as the unit that best demonstrates the similarities between the follower and leader in a bilateral relationship and provides the point of reference for examining the level of followership, which demonstrates the leader’s effectiveness in creating unity of purpose and action amongst followers.

**Followership**

The first use of followership in international relations research was undertaken by Richard Stubbs, who argues that a misunderstanding of the leader-follower relationship develops when the focus is exclusively on the leader. He suggests analyzing leader-follower relations from the bottom up instead of using top down models.

Accepting this perspective, Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal use social psychology’s followership in their examination of the “coalition of the willing” during the Gulf War in 1991. Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal argue that followership is “the degree to which the follower regards the leader and the leader’s ‘vision’ (the goals that the leader seeks for
the collective or the group) as worthy of active and concrete support."\(^{22}\) They conclude that motivation is the key to understanding followership.

According to Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, two types of leaders exist in the followership framework, dominant or benevolent. While The benevolent leader entices followers to act towards a goal, the dominant leader does not have followers but subordinates or minions who collaborate with the leader because of coercion.\(^{23}\) "If leadership consists of getting things accomplished through others, then those ‘others’ are critical to the leader’s effectiveness."\(^{24}\)

As such, the follower is a key element in the examination of alignment cohesion. Thus, leadership is an actor exerting influence while followership is a commonality of purpose, with true “followers want[ing] to feel as if they are partners with their leaders in accomplishing goals and defining a path to the future,” even if the contributions made by the leaders and followers are unequal.\(^{25}\) For Cooper, Higgot and Nossal states can be either “true followers” or not followers.

In their research, Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal found that that Britain was the only coalition member that displayed followership. Consequently, Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal find that the USSR and China participated because of possible financial or political quid pro quos, France participated because of possible post-war profit, while Japan and Germany freeloaded. In addition, they found that, while the rhetoric of many of the states supported the coalition, actions did not match rhetoric.\(^{26}\)

**Rethinking Followership in International Relations**

While the bottom up model used by Stubbs, Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal provides a different perspective of follower – leader relations, two fundamental problems arise with applying social psychology’s followership framework to international relations. The first is that it produces a black and white, follower – not follower, perspective. This problem exists because the framework only uses one unit, motivation, for the analysis of each state’s follower status. The second is that it does not compare the different state’s follower status’ to determine whether the leader has established cohesion within the alignment. Thus, it does not permit for the full spectrum of possible followers and the possible levels of followership.
Barbara Kellerman, in her work on followership, presents an organizational psychology framework that argues that the level of engagement provides five different types of followers: Isolates, Bystanders, Participants, Activists, and Diehards. While her argument for multiple levels based on a single unit can be applied, it is useful to break down this variable into subparts to make it easier to examine the dynamic between states.

As such, Robert Kelley’s organizational psychology followership paradigm, which includes two units of examination - independent/dependent thinking and active/passive action, can be adapted to the examination of interstate relations. Kelley’s paradigm presents five basic types of followers Alienated, Passive, Conformist, Pragmatic and Exemplary. By making a minor change to this paradigm, using goals acceptance instead of thinking, it is possible to apply this framework to the examination of state followers and determine the follower identity. By comparing the identities of the followers, and identifying the predominant follower identity in the alignment, the level of followership is ascertained.

Followership, therefore, is the degree to which the leader has created alignment cohesion, which represents effective leadership. Each level of followership is associated with the predominating follower type; thus, five levels of followership correlate to the five follower identities.

**Exemplary Follower**

The exemplary follower is active in pursuit of the alignment’s goals and acts within the constraints of those goals. Any action taken is not an attempt to present an alternative to the leader, but to support the leader’s vision, and thus the alignment’s norms. Kalevi J. Holsti describes this as a “faithful ally.”

The exemplary follower makes Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s security community possible. According to Adler and Barnett “three characteristics define a community. 1. Members of a community have shared identities, values, and meanings. 2. Those in a community have many sided and direct relations. 3. Communities exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long term interest and perhaps even altruism.” This follower exhibits all these characteristics, including altruism, in its
relationship with the leader. An alignment predominated by these followers is the highest form of followership.

**Exemplary Followership**

Since exemplary followers exhibit the characteristics Adler and Barnett describe in their relationships in the alignment, they establish a security community when responding to change in the international system. Made up predominately of exemplary followers, this level of followership represents effective leadership that leads to the greatest alignment cohesion.

Thus, the leader has established goals and actions that most of the alignment followers accept and are willing to undertake. As such, the leader has created unity of purpose, as well as determined the complementary or cooperative actions that are acceptable to the followers making for the highest level of alignment cohesion and most effective leadership.

**Conformist Follower**

The *conformist* takes no action but agrees with the goals of the alignment. This alignment member is a freeloader and “passes the buck” in the hopes of gaining without incurring costs. As a result, it acts as part of the alignment because it has determined that revision of the international status quo is harmful to its interests. Nonetheless, its participation in the alignment ends with support of the goals, possibly including voting in favor of goals, but does not include any significant actions to help meet those goals.

**Conformist Followership**

An alignment predominated by these followers is less cohesive than one made up of exemplary followers because the conformist accepts the goals but does not participate in attaining them. As such, the leader bears the brunt for maintaining the systemic status quo because of the lack of action by conformist followers. While the contributions made by the leaders and followers can be unequal, without seriously harming the bilateral relationship, actions by the followers that are unequal or equally insufficient directly affects the alignments cohesiveness and suggests poor leadership.
The redeeming character of this followership level is support for the stated alignment goals. This support lends credence to actions taken by the leader or other followers in support of the alignment goals. While the conformist follower’s failure to take action is harmful, its support of the goals maintains alignment cohesion and suggests some effective leadership.

**Scared Follower**

The *scared* follower does not accept goals nor does it take action. While the rhetoric of the passive follower acknowledges the attempt at revisionism, its identity ends there. It does not suggest that it supports the alignment goals. In essence, the scared follower is a cheerleader. While on the field, and associated with one side, it does not play the game.

For the most part, a state that takes this position cannot hide, most often because of its proximity to the threat. Similar to Randall Schweller’s lambs (Robert Kelley even calls them sheep), this follower seeks the protection that an alignment can give. While scared follower’s may be explained by Schweller’s wave of the future bandwagoning, which argues that states join the stronger side because it represents the ‘wave of the future,’ these states join an alignment because they seek protection.

**Scared Followership**

Since the scared follower neither accepts the goals, nor takes action to meet the goals, the alignment does not gain from its inclusion. This alignment is less cohesive because the leader has failed to garner any support from most of the alignment members. Thus, the lack of effective leadership affects followership, even though identity similarity forms among the followers. While these followers do not threaten the alignment’s goals, or take any action, they create a neutral alignment formation that is neither supportive nor antagonistic of the alignment leader. As such, the alignment cohesion is lower because the leadership was ineffective in garnering support for its goals and actions.

**Alienated Follower**
The alienated member acts independently against perceived change in the system and does not accept in the leader’s goals for maintaining the status-quo. This member is part of the alignment because of systemic motivations, though it attempts to pressure or undermine the leader. It may seek to shape the alignment norms, or it may hope to gain authority to the point that it determines the alignment norms. Either way, its actions represent an attempt to act as an internal balancer, to the point where it may be a possible replacement leader. This state is similar to Chong Ja Ian’s beleaguerering state, which attempts to “undermine the influence and authority of the more powerful [state] as well as [its] ability to exercise power through disruption for the purposes of gaining specific concessions.”

Among these alignment members can also be profiteers, similar to Randall Schweller’s jackals. While Schweller argues that jackals are part of a revisionist alignment, they can be member of the status-quo alignment. Since they do not accept the alignment goals, they join the alignment because they can gain from it. As such, they take action that will help them to further this goal. While they do not seek significant revision in the sub-system, the profiteer tries to revise the alignment goals or manipulate the leader so to generate the greatest self-benefit.

**Alienated Followership**

Working in unison, the alienated followers may redefine the goals and actions for systemic victory, even to the point of determining a new alignment leader. As such, this change in the alignment hierarchy can lead to an exemplary followership alignment. Nonetheless, this level of followership represents a failure of leadership, since the alienated followers do not accept the leader’s vision for systemic victory.

An alignment predominated by this follower is the fourth level of followership, and not the lowest level, because, while the leadership may be ineffective in influencing the goals and actions of the followers, the followers are united in their disregard for the leaderships vision. Even if each alienated follower determines different goals and actions to counter the systemic change, their common dislike of the leader’s goals and
actions represents some level of cohesion, in essence negative cohesion based in ineffective leadership.

**Pragmatic Follower and Followership**

The pragmatic follower is different from the other four follower identities. This follower is, in reality, a combination of the all the different followers, changing its status based on interests. It perceives each action and goal differently. Consequently, sometimes it will take action to fulfill alignment goals; other times goals will garner no action or even lead to attempts to change the alignment goals. As such, it responds to revisionism based on its analysis of the different elements of the problem, leading to a conformist or passive follower identity regarding one goal or desired action, and exemplary regarding another. This state is recognized as an alignment member because of its declared systemic motivation only, however, the lack of consistency makes this the lowest form of alignment cohesion, suggesting incapable leadership (or no leadership). Instead of creating unity among the followers the leader has, in essence, established an anarchical alignment, which raises the question whether the “leader” is leading or if there is leadership from a different actor in the system.

**Followership in the International System**

**Systemic Alignments**

While neo-realist argue that states should either balance or bandwagon in response to the most powerful state in the system, neo-liberal and constructivist researchers argue that the lack of balancing and bandwagoning in the post-Cold War disproves neo-realist theories. Nonetheless, states constantly compete for authority because of the anarchic nature of the system.

While Morton Kaplan suggests that change is part of the system, AFK Organski argues that the variables that define a system are irrelevant to system change. Interestingly, while the examination of systemic change includes studies that measure alignment changes by grouping nations based on their similarities, looking for patterns like power distribution, or changes in the international system based on cause and effect, there is a lack of literature about the dynamics of a system in transition.
Accepting Organski’s argument that the variables that define the system are irrelevant in the examination of systemic change, the number of systemic actors does not matter in a transitional period. Furthermore, while power distribution in the system may point to the change towards one type of system, mutual interests can lead to changes in the power distribution that lead to a different type of system. In essence, this move from one systemic possibility to another is dependent upon the acceptance of the changes that are taking place in the system. States that are unwilling to accept the changes will seek to revise the system, either unilaterally or with help, so that the outcome of the transition accommodates their interests. While some transitional periods may be fast, resulting from the outcome of war, others may take time as states develop long term interactions that grow into and establish systemic stability.

Some examples of transitional periods include the immediate post-World War II years when the US had a nuclear monopoly. Had no other state sought to change the system in response to this development the system, based on power distribution, would have maintained its unipolar movement. The United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) revised the system in 1949 when they detonated their own nuclear weapon. This detonation led to escalation that developed into a bipolar system. Another example is the post-WW I years which led to a rise in number of states in system, colonialization, and questions about which states would keep which areas of influence. If the system had not been in transition then the post-war status-quo would have remained. Rather than accept this status-quo, however, some of the states sought diplomatic measures that would lead to changes in the power distribution.

The followership framework presented here argues that transition, in which the level of systemic revisionism determines alignment formation, characterizes the post-Cold War period. If no actor wishes to change the status-quo then alignment formation should not occur and the system should maintain its power distribution. If, however, systemic revisionism occurs, then alignments should form to maintain the status-quo and/or to support changing it.
Defining Alignments

To examine comparative alignment identities, we must first establish what alignments are. George Modelski notes that “alignments’ can be regarded as a blanket term referring to all types of international political cooperation.” While alliances and coalitions are subsets of Modelski’s alignments, researchers suggest four criteria to differentiate between coalitions and alliances: the period in which cooperation is to take place, the scope of the cooperation, the formality of the relationship and the number of actors involved in the relationship.

Avi Kober, in his work on coalition defection, notes that states are motivated to participate in coalitions in response to a wide scope of activities, while Modelski and others point out that security matters are the motivation behind alliances. Both Kober and Modelski present a neo-realist perspective when they argue that coalitions, like alignments, are oriented around ad-hoc short-term interests, while alliances are grounded in long-term interests.

Furthermore, relationship formality and number of participants are both problematic criterion for differentiating between alliances and coalitions. First, states can have significant but not formal alliances. Second, while coalitions are often broader based and alliances are smaller, this is not always the case. Using these two criterions in studying alignments can distort research because they fail to provide for informal interactions or numeric disparity.

As subsets of alignments, alliances and coalitions are deeply intertwined, making it possible to examine alignments motivated by security issues by expanding the alliance definition to include informal relations, short-term interests, and broader participation. Thus, alignments are formal, or informal, cooperation between two or more states, based on long or short-term security interests. It is important to note that this does not preclude the inclusion of non-state actors in an alignment, but requires that at least two states participate in the alignment, in addition to any non-state actors involved.
The final aspect of the definition, security interests, opens the door to the examination of why alignments may form in any given system. While the definition argues that security interests are the motivation for alignment formation, it does not determine how the alignment manifests at any given point in time.

**Alignments in a Multipolar System**

Morton Kaplan’s analysis of the balance-of-power model defines six characteristics inherent to the multipolar system. 1) The only actors are nation-states, 2) Major nation goals are security oriented, 3) The system is not nuclear, 4) Every actor seeks more than its proportionate share of system capabilities to guarantee security, 5) There must be five major powers in the system, and 6) Even great nations are likely to involve allies in obtaining objectives. 45

According to Kaplan, the international system incorporated these six characteristics during the first half of the 20th century and several centuries before that. During this time, powerful states competed to expand their control over limited resources, and fought to maintain control of the resources that they had. Strong states intervened all over the world and expanded their power bases by building extensive empires. 46 Before World War II, balance-of-power mechanisms controlled alignment formation. In this multipolar system states allied to counter more powerful states.

Kenneth Waltz’s balance-of-power theory argues that the absolute power of a state is threatening, leading weaker states to form alliances to balance against a more powerful state, as long as the weaker state cannot increase its own power unilaterally. On the other hand, weaker states can also bandwagon, or join, with a powerful one if they cannot collect enough power to balance. 47

In this system, great powers, like England, used alliances to avoid war, increasing their power to control the outcome of a war, and deny hegemony to any other power in the system. 48 During this time, states were dependent on each other for balancing perceived changes of power in the system.
**Alignments in a Bipolar System**

After World War II, the international system changed, as two states rose to superpower status. In this system, the alignments sought not only to balance perceived power differences but also to counter perceived threats. The Cold War bipolar system consisted of two groups of bandwagoning states seeking security. In this bipolar system, the two alignments perceived each other’s offensive capabilities and intentions as threatening. As such, systemic leaders tried to increase their relative capabilities. \(^{49}\) Furthermore, in this two-bloc system, superpowers were not reliant on other states to balance against the perceived threat.

As a result, Stephen Walt\(^ {50}\) refines Waltz’s theory, suggesting that the absolute power of the state is not the threat. Instead, he argues that states are motivated to form alliances to balance threats from geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions, leading states to either balance against a threat, or bandwagon with it. \(^ {51}\)

As such, Walt best describes the systemic motivation for alignment formation during the Cold War. While Ted Hopf is, for the most part, correct in his constructivist description of the Cold War as two ideological blocs in competition for hegemony, this does not explain the motivation for alignment formation or participation, which was the integrity of the states’ political systems and independence, both issues of security. \(^ {52}\)

According to Walt, leadership in a bipolar system is dependent on the perception of security by the weaker states. While states that bandwagon with the threatening state accept its leadership to guarantee their security, states that balance against the threat seek security in numbers and concede leadership to the state most likely to guarantee that security. Since security is the motivation for alignment formation in this system, bloc members will support the leader even on issues where their short-term interests do not coincide. \(^ {53}\) This creates homogeneous groups of security followers under the leadership of the most powerful states in the system.
**Alignment in the Post-Cold War**

While the theories described can be used to examine alignments in multipolar and bipolar systems, they do not explain the continuation of such alignments in the post-Cold War, from 1989 through 2005. The end of the Cold War presents an interesting dilemma regarding intra-alignment relations.

First, models for Patron - Client relations, which were used to describe relationships between, and within, alignments in the Cold War international system, are no longer relevant. Second, while the collapse of the USSR, which left the US as the sole remaining superpower, created the perception that the system was leaning towards unipolarity and possibly hegemony, this was not the case.

As such, constructivists argue that the lack of balancing and bandwagoning in the unipolar system disproves neo-realist theories, pointing out that NATO, and other Cold War alliances, should have disbanded. Furthermore, constructivists and neo-liberals point to states failure to balance or bandwagon in response to the US, as the most powerful state in the system, as further proof that neo-realists cannot explain post-Cold War state interaction. Their basic argument is that the neo-realist ideas, which may have explained the motivation behind alignment formations during the Cold War, are not supported by the continued existence of Cold War alignments once the threat, namely the Soviet Union, disappears.

The constructivists attempt to include social/ideological motivations to explain the continuation of alignments in the post-Cold War is also problematic for understanding alignment formation. On the one hand, they argue that anarchy is not an inherent part of state interaction, but that the structure of the system is anarchic because states choose to make it so. On the other they suggest that change in states relations is dependent on an external force because their interactions lead to mutually reinforcing roles in the relationship. Thus, the anarchy chosen by the states is a constraint on their systemic choices and requires an external source for change to occur. This leads to a contradiction: states choose anarchy but relational dependency creates role reinforcement (limits anarchy) within the system.
Alternatively, neo-liberals, like Galia Press Bar-Natan, suggest that geographic variation, perception of intentions, various domestic factors, and ideology are the motivating forces behind cooperation; ignoring systemic variables as possible motivations for alignment formation. As such, the neo-liberal argument that domestic pressures establish a national strategic culture cannot to explain systemic motivations for cohesive international strategic structures. While some neo-liberals suggest that the continued existence of NATO demonstrates the role of institutions in international politics, they do not address informal alignments based on systemic perspectives.

Furthermore, the neo-liberal argument assumes a structure in which no state, or states, can or want to balance against the systemic leader. Chong Ja Ian, suggests that in the post-Cold War world balancing and bandwagoning no longer apply. According to Ja Ian, second-tier states cannot change the distribution of power in the post-Cold War system, they can only try to take actions independent of the powerful state. He proposes four second-tier state responses in this system: Buffering, Bonding, Binding, and Beleaguering.

Buffering represents the lessening of authority of the more powerful state through the creation of neutral, geographic, or functional spheres. Bonding is the establishment of a function or service that other states, including the predominant state, find indispensable. Binding occurs when weaker states use international institutions and agreements to restrain the actions of a powerful state. Beleaguering represents an attempt to “undermine the influence and authority of the more powerful [state] as well as [its] ability to exercise power through disruption for the purposes of gaining specific concessions.”

Ja Ian also notes a fifth strategy that a state can undertake, hiding. This strategy represents a withdrawal into isolation as a response to international tension. He suggests that hiding may not be an acceptable strategy in the post-Cold War system and as such chooses to ignore it.

While Ja Ian addresses the ability of states to take independent action he does not examine the possibility that second tier states will work with the predominant state
because of shared, or complementary, systemic interests. Each of his strategies represents a form of balancing, i.e. opposition to or lessening of predominant state authority.

As such, neo-liberals fail to consider that possibility that weaker states choose to align with the predominant state, as in the post-Cold War system. Thus, the neo-liberal theories cannot explain alignment formation and are insufficient to explain state interaction and cooperation at the systemic and sub-systemic levels.

Instead, neoclassical realism argues that the post-Cold War balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy is not due to the search for security but systemic stability versus systemic change. Randall Schweller explains alignment formation as a status-quo/revisionist dichotomy in which similar systemic interests motivate states to align with each other.

Therefore, the post-Cold War is best described as a transitional system in which states aligned either for security to maintain the status-quo or to revise the balance (or perceived imbalance). Thus, bandwagoning was not necessarily the capitulation of a state that perceived power, or intentions, as a threat. On this basis, Schweller’s balance-of-interest theory best explains the motivation for alignment formation during this time.

Rethinking Alignment Formation

In the post-Cold War, neoclassical realism can be used to respond to the critiques of neo-realist alliance literature. First, institutions consist of states and continue to exist because the state members have redefined, constricted, or expanded the motivation behind the alliance. In the post-Cold War system, many of these institutions continue to exist as a way for the US to exert power and control. As such, Cold War institutions continue to exist because: 1. the influential states in the institutions have redefined their systemic motivation, 2. influence, as the classical realist definition of power, is the motivation for the creation, and continued existence, of alliances.

Second, in the post-Cold War system states are motivated to align because of either status-quo or revisionist interests. As such, this system is “subsystem dominant.”
While alignments in the post-Cold War form either to maintain the systemic status-quo or with revisionist intent, they ultimately want to manipulate the global system and maintain, or attain, systemic dominance.\(^7\) Randall Schweller argues that, since the system is anarchic, system stratification occurs because differences in power “perpetuate inequality” and create a hierarchy.\(^7\) Schweller argues that the balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy is not security centric, as Waltz and Walt suggest, but rather explains alliances as a status-quo/revisionist dichotomy in which similar systemic interests motivate states to align with each other. Thus, states that align for stability do so to maintain the systemic status-quo, while states that ally for self-extension do so to revise the systemic balance (or perceived imbalance).

Schweller argues that in this system leadership is a scarce resource.\(^7\) During the Cold War, there was no conflict over leadership in alliances. In the post-Cold War, powerful alignment members attempt to guide the leadership to determine alignment interests. This conflict for leadership leads to a subsystemic hierarchy.

In a balance-of-interest system bandwagoning is not necessarily the capitulation of a state that perceives power or intentions as a threat. Instead, it can be motivated by a desire to profit which Schweller defines as “jackal bandwagoning,” or the desire to be associated with the winning side in a war, “pile-on bandwagoning.”\(^7\) Schweller presents four types of bandwagoning based on the motivation of the weaker state; “jackal,” “pile-on,” “wave-of-the-future,” and “contagion.” “Jackal” and “pile-on” are both profit based. “Wave-of-the-future” is security based and “contagion” is based on proximity (essentially threat perception).\(^7\) In all these types of bandwagoning, the weaker state’s identity within the subsystem is directly associated with their motivation for alignment participation.

**Leadership and Followership in the System**

Schweller, unlike neo-realists and neo-liberals, also allows for the determination of leadership and followership in the post-Cold War system. Neo-realists, like Kenneth Waltz, explain that weaker states join alignments to balance against a more powerful
state because fear determines participation in the alignment and power determines leadership.\textsuperscript{77}

Stephen Walt suggests that absolute power is overly narrow for understanding alignment creation and leadership and argues that geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions are motivations for alignment formation.\textsuperscript{78} States that bandwagon with the threatening state do so to mitigate the threat, and, in so doing, accept its leadership to guarantee their security. States that balance against a threat seek security in numbers and concede leadership to the state most likely to guarantee that security. Thus, security is the motivation for alignment formation and leadership, and members will support the leader even on issues where their short-term interests do not coincide to maintain their security.\textsuperscript{79} This creates homogeneous groups of security followers under the leadership of the most powerful states in the system, making Walt’s model problematic because it does not include follower influence on the leader or changes in followership.

Despite US power and dominance, leadership in the post-Cold War was an unclear, as within a balance-of-interest system.\textsuperscript{80} Unlike the neo-liberal hegemonic stability theory, different members of the alignment attempted to sway or gain leadership to determine goals and actions.\textsuperscript{81} This conflict formed a hierarchic sub-system because the anarchic nature of the system led to stratification.\textsuperscript{82}

Thus, the level of systemic revisionism is the best independent variable for examining followership in the post-Cold War. Unlike the neo-realist “homogeneous followers,” or the neo-liberal “unimportant followers,” a balance-of-interest system presents a framework that supports different types of followers that determine and change leadership effectiveness.

**Follower Identity**

While the balance-of-interest theory best explains alignment formation, it does not create the necessary framework to determine followership. As mentioned, while Stubbs, Cooper, Higgit, and Nossal suggest that motivation is best the variable for determining followership, they fail to recognize the possibility of different types of followers. In contrast, the paradigm applied here establishes the level of followership
because it includes two units of examination that lead to multiple follower types. Thus, by examining the similarities and differences of the sub-system’s follower identity the level of followership is determined.

Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott present four elements that help to determine identity: 1) Constitutive Norms, norms that define the group, 2) Social Purposes, goals shared by the group, 3) Relational Comparisons, views about other identities or groups, and 4) Cognitive Models, “worldviews or understandings of political and material conditions.” They also point out that contestation, or conflict, among group members helps to define the group’s relations.

All these elements are essential for the determination of the follower identity. First, alignments are made up of states that have specific relational comparisons and cognitive models. These states have aligned because they recognize an “other” within the system and they share similar perspectives about that “other.” As Ted Hopf explains, the constructivist’s perspective on identity is a relational comparison with another actor or actors in the system. This alone is insufficient to determine the follower identity. Instead it helps explain the alignment at the systemic level, influencing the subsystemic follower identity.

Identity is, at its basic level, reflects the strategic choices that each state makes. Strategy is the relationship between “ends, ways, and means. Ends are the objectives or goals sought. Means are the resources available to pursue the objectives. And Ways or methods are how one organizes and applies the resources.” Thus, strategy is a combination of each state’s goals, or Abdelal et al.’s social purposes, and actions (methods) used to reach those goals. These choices are a function of the possible options that are available to a state based on the norms, or “vision” set out by the leader.

Thus, the follower identity in the subsystem is a function of both strategy and the state’s relational comparison with the other states in the subsystem. As Kenneth F. Janda notes, while not all power relations are leader-follower relationships, leader-
follower relations are inherently power-wielder - power-recipient. The relational comparison with other states is also a function of the position of the state within the subsystemic hierarchy. Power helps to determine which states can vie for leadership.

Since the follower identity connects state strategies (goals and actions) with power, weaker states are more likely to have a higher follower identity because weak states seek to pressure the leader, and, since their control as an alienated follower is limited by their lack of power, they try to manipulate the leader through an exemplary follower identity. While power determines a state’s weight in the alignment hierarchy, stronger states are more likely to wield their power to manipulate the alignment goals and actions while weak states are more likely to use their similarity to the leader to influence the goals and actions.

Unlike the Cold War, membership in a post-Cold War alignment does not require weaker states to surrender their identity to the alignment norms. As such some of the states in the alignment can try to become the leader, resulting in competition as each tries to control the goals and actions of the alignment by broadening their power-base with the help of other members. Applying the level of follower identity as an intervening variable helps to establish the level of followership in the alignment by analyzing the intra-alignment dynamic between the follower and leader.

**Examining Followership**

Once the alignment follower identities are known, comparing them over time determines changes in the level of followership which represents alignment cohesion and effective leadership. Since this work examines the level of followership in response to the WMD proliferation by 1) establishing the recognition of an “other” within the system that leads to alignment formation, 2) determining each state’s follower identity, and 3) comparing the follower identities over time to find the level of followership, it consists of a comparative analysis of the strategies of the states based on a combination of both events data and content analysis. Each state’s response to WMD proliferation can stand alone as a case study in follower – leader antiproliferation relations. In a comparative framework, they provide a baseline to examine the effectiveness of Western leadership in response to WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War.
Follower Identities

Britain

Britain’s Cold War identity was a function of the bipolar system. The UK’s ability to take on any other role, except to bandwagon or to balance, was mitigated by the existence of two superpowers that were struggling with each other and did not consider Britain a threat to their leadership positions or to the system as a whole.

As the Cold War came to a close and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) no longer posed a significant threat to the US, it seemed that Britain, and other world powers, would act in unison to balance against the US. This did not happen. Instead, the years immediately following the Cold War saw Britain maintain an exemplary follower identity, with its goals and actions coinciding with, and helping meet, the Western alignment norms as determined by the US.

However, between 1989 and 1995 Britain’s followership identity did change. While Britain displayed an exemplary follower identity earlier in this timeframe, especially in response to Iraq’s possible WMD proliferation, it began to show leanings towards a conformist identity in its antiproliferation policies by the mid-1990s. While Britain supported US antiproliferation, its lack of support for the US Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) and export controls policies suggested it did not accept some US antiproliferation actions.

Early in the 1995–2001 period, Britain’s followership identity reached a nadir, marking it as an alienated follower. This was especially true in their difference of opinion regarding diplomacy versus military actions in antiproliferation. While the mid-1990s saw Britain’s follower identity at its low, this did not mean that Britain had decided to remove itself from the Western alignment. At that time, Britain chose not to support the US CPI, instead taking its own counterproliferation steps, especially to safeguard its armed forces.

In addition, Britain’s resolve that NATO’s proliferation risk assessment, implication analysis, and capability improvement determination not include the US CPI as the basis for analyses and decisions, as well as British support for NATO’s policy of proliferation prevention through diplomatic means further demonstrated Britain’s alienated
Furthermore, Britain tried to use its alienated identity to influence US policy regarding WMD proliferation, specifically chemical weapons, during this time. The British government ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), something that the US had not done, hoping that this would lead to the US (and Russia) to also ratify the convention.\footnote{90}

By the late 1990s, Britain’s goals and actions began to coincide with those of the US as British policymakers were provided with more intelligence that recognized the rise of not only state, but non-state, elements of proliferation. Britain’s ability to influence US arms control practices, and its stance on the CWC, demonstrated the influence Britain’s alienated identity had on the alignment norms. The differences regarding the CPI, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and export controls, that led to its alienated identity, did not significantly influence the level of coordination and cooperation in intelligence gathering, or Britain’s support of US no-fly zone policies and sanctions in response to Iraqi WMD proliferation.

Towards the end of the 1995–2001 timeframe, Britain was once again taking on an exemplary identity, with the goals and actions undertaken meeting or helping those of the US. While Britain still maintained some conformist traits, most evident in its response to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, most of its goals and actions were beginning to coincide with the alignment norms. After 9/11, most of the alienated characteristics that had surfaced were no longer present.

The year following 9/11 was marked by terrorist attacks as well as many thwarted attempts, both worldwide and in the United Kingdom. These attacks, and the discovery of possible WMD terrorist threats inside the UK, pushed Britain to cooperate with the US, and to deal decisively with the WMD threats posed by groups like al-Qaida, and rogue states like Iraq.\footnote{91}

British policy changes between late 2002 and early 2003 led to a higher level of similarity between US and UK antiproliferation goals and actions. There was greater recognition of the source, transport, and end user elements of proliferation, and the initial steps were taken to halt the funding of WMD proliferation. By acknowledging
these combined elements both the US and the UK began to cooperate more, with the UK accepting more of the US goals and the actions to meet those goals.

Working with the US, Britain helped push forward some momentous breakthroughs in countering WMD proliferation. The UK worked with the US in response to Libya’s WMD programs and in countering Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan's proliferation network. Britain also participated actively in establishing and taking part in the US proposed Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as well as pushing other countries to do the same.

By the end of the 2001–2005 period, Britain was once again an exemplary follower in the US-led alignment. Working together on the PSI, coordinating the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, offering Iraq under Saddam Hussein "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations," and then 1540 requiring states to implement domestic legislation to prevent non-state actors from manufacturing, acquiring, or transporting NBC weapons within or from their territory.92

In addition sharing intelligence related to all of the elements of proliferation led to greater cooperation and teamwork both in terms of defining the goals of the alignment and the actions needed to meet those goals. Britain did not hesitate, when necessary, to take action it deemed necessary (engaging Libya in dialogue for example) that would further the alignment antiproliferation goals. It did not seek to usurp the leadership role of the US. Instead, as an exemplary follower, it sought to strengthen its cooperation with the US in order to be able to influence both policy and military decisions.

**Australia**

While not a perfect follower during the Cold War, Australia accepted most of the goals set by the US. It clearly functioned as a member of the Western alignment and, as neo-realists would argue, sought to balance the systemic threat through this alignment.

Like Britain, Australia demonstrated an exemplary follower identity at the beginning of the 1989 – 1995 period. This can best be seen in Australia’s participation in the first Gulf War. While its participation was limited, it was, for Australia, a demonstration of vested interest in helping the US attain its antiproliferation goals.
Soon after the Gulf War Australia’s interest in participating in actions to support the US decreased. The relationship between Australia and the US underwent a process of change after the first Gulf War. While defense and security ties remained strong, the importance of the Asia Pacific region to both countries led to a shift away from the emphasis on the Western alignment interests and instead towards independent common interests. While the US placed nonproliferation concerns at the top of its agenda, an approach that Australia strongly supported, some of the policies, especially the CPI, ran counter to Australian policies.

Most significantly, the differences between Australia and the US manifested themselves in the debate of multilateral nonproliferation norms versus unilateral actions to halt WMD proliferation. While the US forfeited leadership on some level to Australia, especially regarding the nonproliferation of chemical weapons, as well as in the AG, Australia did act as a follower, working to maintain the status quo at the very least. Nonetheless, Australia was more inclined to adapt regional goals then act to support those goals in the mid 1990s. In addition, Australia’s work maintaining the status quo was, from their perspective, the starting point for international disarmament, something that the US had not defined as a goal.

As such, while Australia was part of the Western alignment, adamantly and systemically opposing WMD proliferation, Australia sought to redefine the Western alignment antiproliferation goals, seeking bilateral or multilateral diplomatic solutions to reach those goals, even if this led to it countering the goals or actions of the US as the alignment leader. Thus, by late 1993 Australia displayed a clear alienated follower identity.

Even though the acceptance by the US of the transport element of proliferation in the mid-1990s brought Australian and US goals slightly closer, there was still a divide about the best way to respond. This was not only evident regarding the CPI, but also in the response to the CWC. While Australia was among the first states to sign and ratify the document, the US had not done so.
The difference of opinion between the US and Australian positions on Pakistan, India, and Israel regarding the NPT further manifested Australia alienated follower identity. While the US accepted, and even protected Israeli ambiguity and the three state’s non-signatory status, Australian policymakers wanted to push for their acceptance of the NPT and disarmament where necessary.  

Meanwhile, Australia maintained multilateral nonproliferation and norm-building as its response to WMD proliferation. While US and Australian policies on security and antiproliferation were running parallel courses by late 1997, Australia was far less prone to take action, beyond those actions required by multilateral nonproliferation regimes, to enforce WMD capability denial. Furthermore, while accepting the alignment’s broader antiproliferation goals, Australia sought to redefine its policies to meet its interests of a regional antiproliferation without accepting the US policy of resorting to force.  

This changed, however, in 1998 when Iraq chose to deny UN inspectors access to information and facilities. While this proliferation threat did not significantly change Australia’s follower identity, Australia did accept the US position that military force was the only way to bring about Saddam Hussein’s compliance.  

The move away from alienated follower was further demonstrated in the mutual responses by both Australia and the US to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear detonations in 1998. These actions were taken as both India and Pakistan sought to revise the systemic status quo and establish themselves as proven nuclear weapons states, which was unacceptable to the US and Australian antiproliferation policies.  

By mid-2001, Australian and US legislation also began to coincide, especially regarding intelligence agency responses to WMD proliferation. These changes included the possibility of action against Australian nationals participating in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or committing a serious crime by moving money to that end.  

While these changes represented another move closer to
US goals and actions for antiproliferation, they were not significant enough to argue a change in Australia’s followership status.

After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, Australian and US antiproliferation policies began to converge because of the rise of both state and non-state revisionist systemic actors. Changes in policy led to similar goals and actions by Australia and the US. These changes led to a symbiosis that suggests that Australia’s followership identity had changed by the end of the period under examination back from an alienated to an exemplary follower.

For Australia, there was a clear understanding that the war on terror and Iraqi WMDs represented an inherent threat to systemic stability. Australian participation in actions to counter these represented a watershed that led to greater cooperation and similarity and bringing its antiproliferation policies in line to those of the US. While Australia still maintained that multilateral nonproliferation regimes were essential to counter WMD proliferation, they took greater actions in cooperation with the US towards meeting their antiproliferation goals.

By the end of 2004, Australian and US antiproliferation goals were no longer running parallel, but separate, courses. Instead, the US had accepted some of the goals established by Australia, including the establishment of national legislation in response to WMD proliferation and the strengthening of export controls, as well as the elements of the proliferation chain, including recognition of the transport and financial elements. Australia, in the meantime, had accepted the use of military action as a necessary part of antiproliferation.

**Examining Followership**

While this work does not use quantitative analysis for the examination of followership, it is useful to use a graphical representation to see the change in follower identity and then compare the different identities over time.
As we can see in this figure 1, the years immediately after the Cold War Britain’s followership status changed significantly. It is clear that the UK, and the US, identified and responded proliferation, though not always using similar methods, throughout the 1989–2005 timeframe.

While they did not, necessarily, undertake similar actions to reach the alignment antiproliferation goals, their actions were generally complimentary to each other. The change to conformist follower and then alienated follower, including unilateral goal setting, and independent action, meant that there were significant differences between Britain and the US, as the Western leader. It was not until the late 1990s that Britain’s follower identity was once returning to an exemplary level. Britain’s follower identity further solidified as exemplary after 9/11 with the recognition of NBC terror as a direct threat to the British homeland. This, in addition to the general rise in WMD proliferation, led Britain to maintain and further its exemplary follower identity.
Not unlike Britain, Australia began the post-Cold War period as an exemplary follower as seen in figure 2. This quickly changed so that by the mid-1990s Australia’s follower identity was clearly that of an alienated follower. As such, Australia sought to push its perception of antiproliferation and the proliferation chain as possible alternatives to the US policies and perceptions. While the US and Australia did take mutual action during this time, specifically in response to Iraqi noncompliance, these actions were limited and did not represent a significant change in Australian antiproliferation goals and actions.

After 9/11, Australia’s follower identity had reverted to exemplary. By the end of the 1989–2005 period Australia’s alienated follower identity had influenced the Western alignment leader to the point where the US had adopted some of Australia’s goals for maintaining the systemic status quo. At the same time, Australia took greater action to support the US defined goals, bringing its follower identity back to the exemplary status it had immediately after the Cold War.
As figure 3 shows, the level of Western alignment cohesion was low for a significant part of the post-Cold War. While US leadership in response to WMD proliferation was successful at the outset of the post-Cold War period, it quickly lost its stance as the determinant of goals and actions for western alignment antiproliferation. The move to a mixed, and then alienated followership alignment suggests that there was significant tension regarding the determination of goals and actions to maintain the systemic status quo. This can be seen as both Britain and Australia took an alienated stance in response to US antiproliferation from 1993 the late 1990s/early 2000s. This raises the question whether the US was the leader during this time in response to WMD proliferation revisionism.

The changes in alignment cohesion seem to be directly related to changes in each follower’s perception of systemic revisionism. After the first Gulf War both Australia and Britain did not see WMD proliferation revisionism on the same level as the US. This led them to try to redefine the alignment’s goals and actions to better meet their understanding of how WMD proliferation threatened the systemic status quo.
Later in the 1990s, as each state recognized the different elements of WMD perception as threatening the status quo, their actions and goals began to coincide with those of the US. This change led to greater alignment cohesion under US leadership.

It is clear that the US was able to reestablish leadership of both Australia and Britain as the level of revisionism rose. As such, while Britain and Australia’s alienated identities helped to redefine the alignment norms so that they could once again establish themselves as exemplary followers, the US did, in the post-9/11 period, determine the goals and actions needed to maintain the status quo.

**Conclusion**

The post-Cold War transitional period was representative of significant changes in Western alignment antiproliferation cohesion. States that had been staunch supporters of the US, as the alignment leader, during and immediately after the Cold War sought to redefine western antiproliferation in the post-Cold War. This lead to drop in the level of alignment cohesion as Australia and Britain’s antiproliferation actions did not help to meet the US goals, but instead pushed towards goals they perceived as necessary to maintain the systemic status quo.

Clearly the examination of two states as followers is not enough to make a clear cut determination of the level of western alignment cohesion in response to WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War, but the fact that two of the most prominent members of that alignment were alienated followers suggests that the level of alignment cohesion was low. This raises the question of which state might have been vying for leadership during this time. Further research into Western alignment state’s post-Cold War antiproliferation policies will help determine if the level of alignment cohesion was as low as it seems here, and, if so, which states may have been seeking alignment leadership.
Appendix 1: Follower Types and Hierarchy of Followership

Follower Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Passive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alienated</td>
<td>Scared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplary</td>
<td>Conformist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepts Goals</td>
<td>Doesn’t Accept Goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hierarchy of Followership

- Predominantly Exemplary Followership (Highest Cohesion)
- Predominantly Conformist Followership
- Predominantly Scared Followership
- Predominantly Alienated Followership
- Predominantly Pragmatic Followership
- Mixed Followership (Lowest Cohesion)


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